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This report is the result of a one-year research project, 
which investigates the adequacy of the current governance 
framework for cybersecurity in the maritime shipping 
industry using Denmark as a main reference. More 
specifically, the report discusses the roles of technology, 
regulation and self-regulatory schemes in building a 
governance framework to ensure cyber security within 
maritime shipping. It departs from the question of whether 
it makes sense to regulate cybersecurity in shipping, at the 
industry level, considering that shipping organizations 
themselves are the main beneficiaries of cyber hygiene or 
cyber resilience. In the process of exploring this and 
related questions we have consulted reports, applicable 
regulation, and policies at the national and supranational 
levels, interviewed key stakeholders in the Danish 
shipping industry, and participated in relevant events. On a 
general level, we conclude that the superposition of 
regulatory and self-regulatory structures, combined with 
the use of technology, are indispensable for providing 
cyber resilience, taking into account particularities of the 
industry and of cybersecurity itself. Given current 
technological developments in the field of digitalization, 
which connect information technology (IT) and 
operational technology (OT) in shipping, cybersecurity is 
now closely associated with ship safety, thus making 
regulation necessary and the insertion of cybersecurity into 
the ISM code adequate. Still, one should not discount the 
importance of guidelines provided by industry actors, 
which account for the layer of self-regulation. Finally, 
although technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI), 
play a vital role in preventing cyber threats, their main 
contribution lies in directing human behavior towards 
desirable outcomes – for example, by enforcing the use of 
strong passwords. This reaffirms the principle that the 
main tool in fighting cyber threats continue to be human 
beings themselves. It is to that extent that we propose, as a 
tool for “cruising digitalization”, that shipping 
organizations establish a clearer connection between the 
safety of information systems and ship safety. In this line, 
we suggest that, similarly to other health and safety issues, 
cyber resilience should be framed as an issue of social 
responsibility in the maritime shipping industry, and a 
priority issue for top management, and for each and every 
employee. In a country such as Denmark, which prides 
itself of its high level of digitalization, and for whom the 
shipping industry is paramount, this becomes furthermore 
an opportunity to increase the level of identification 
between shipping organizations and their employees, and 
to increase the proximity between the goals of the industry 
and those of the Danish society.  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
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Despite general claims concerning the maritime shipping 
industry’s low permeability to innovation and high 
attachment to tradition, its digital transformation is now 
conspicuous. As the use of internet of things (IoT) sensors 
powered by artificial intelligence (AI) and machine 
learning within vessels allows for the profuse generation, 
collection, and processing of digital data, new business 
models are being created, and traditional sources of 
revenue are becoming obsolete1.  In the same vein, 
progress in AI and robotics are pushing prototypes of 
automated and unmanned ships to a whole new level, 
while blockchain solutions connect the supply chain 
without need for intermediaries2.   
This high dependence on computerized systems and 
information and communication technologies, and the fact 
that most vessels are now permanently connected to the 
internet can, however, be met with yet another type of 
disruption, besides the disruption of traditional businesses 
models: namely the stalling of, or interference with, 
shipping operations due to cyber incidents. It is also in this 
sense that cruising digitalization, a metaphor we use in 
allusion to a smooth adaption to digital technologies, can 
become a challenge.  
In the last couple of years, several regulatory actions 
targeted at increasing the maritime shipping industry’s 
cyber resilience, or reducing cyber threats, have been 
taken. Most notably, the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), through its Maritime Safety 
Committee has adopted a resolution requiring 
administrations to ensure that cyber risks are addressed in 
safety management systems3.  Additionally, the committee 
approved guidelines on maritime cyber risk management, 
thus alerting to the importance of the integrity of 
information systems to the vessel’s safety and security4.  
At the regional level, these regulatory pieces connect with 
the European Union’s Directive on Security of Network 
                                                          
1 On this topic, see Danish Ship Finance and Rainmaking (2018), on the 
final references. 
2 On this topic, see Lloyd’s Register et al. (2017), on the final references. 
3 Resolution MSC. 428 (98), adopted on 16 June 2017. See final 
references. 
4 Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management. Published on 5 July 
2017. See final references. 
5 Directive on security of network and information systems. Adopted by 
the European Parliament on 6 July 2016 and entered into force in August 
and Information Systems (NIS Directive)5 and to some 
extent with the well-known General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR)6.  At the Danish (national) level, 
which is the focus of this report, they are associated with 
the Danish Maritime Authority’s 2019 Cyber and 
Information Security Strategy for the Maritime Sector, a 
sub-strategy within the Ministry of Finance’s broader 
Danish Cyber and Information Security Strategy of 20187.  
The above listed regulatory efforts have been 
complemented by a series of self-regulatory initiatives on 
the part of industry actors. Most notably, BIMCO, together 
with other industry organizations, have released in 2018 
the third version of their guidelines on cyber security on 
board ships, which are considered as a good parameter by 
national organizations8.    
Having this regulatory and policy context as background, 
this report sets out to explore the question of whether the 
current governance framework for cybersecurity in the 
maritime shipping industry is adequate. More specifically, 
we departed from the following questions: 
Is there a need for regulating cybersecurity in the shipping 
industry? In other words, does it make sense to create and 
enforce rules upon the actors that seem to be the main 
beneficiaries of these rules – namely, maritime shipping 
organizations? Or would that amount to an unnecessary 
intervention by legislators in an instance where the market 
alone and/or technology are sufficient to reach the desired 
outcomes? Finally, in case regulation is necessary, what 
kind of governance framework is appropriate? 
Without ignoring the global character of the industry, as 
well as the importance of the international regulatory 
structure and the supply chain, we attempt to answer these 
questions by focusing on Denmark. More specifically, we 
explore the Danish Shipping industry’s current 
cybersecurity governance framework and its 
particularities.  
2016. See final references. https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/network-and-information-security-nis-directive 
6 Regulation EU 2016/679 of the European Parliament and the Council. 
See final references. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679 
7 See final references. 
8 See final references. 
INTRODUCTION 
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As a result of this effort, we have come to a better 
understanding of the particularities of cybersecurity 
(within and outside shipping) and a deeper knowledge of 
the shipping industry itself. More specifically, the report 
concludes that the key for understanding the particular 
“governance model” adopted by the shipping industry 
(both in Denmark and globally) to tackle cybersecurity lies 
in the current interdependencies that exist between 
information technology (IT) and operation technology 
(OT). The blurring of boundaries between IT and OT also 
connects the integrity of information systems with the 
safety of vessels, passengers and crew, thus making 
cybersecurity a key point in allowing the industry to cruise 
digitalization. This connection, moreover, reinforces the 
need for international regulation, while not dispensing with 
self-regulatory schemes.  
This report is divided in 7 sections. After this introduction, 
clarification of the methodology is provided:  i.e., the types 
of sources consulted, as well as description of the research 
process. The section titled “Clearing the waters: what is 
cybersecurity?” initializes the “review of the literature” 
with a broad discussion on the meaning of cybersecurity. 
Here, there lies an attempt to make sense of the subject by 
clarifying the relationship between cybersecurity and 
information security, the areas to which cybersecurity 
applies, as well as differences in terms of perpetrators and 
motivations. We close with a brief discussion of 
cybersecurity from the perspective of externalities, which 
connects directly with the issue of regulation. 
The fourth section (Regulation and self-regulation in the 
maritime shipping industry), which is the most extensive, 
marks our incursion into the field of shipping. More 
specifically, it starts with a historical and policy account of 
regulation in maritime shipping and then moves into more 
theoretical discussions on the effectiveness of alternative 
co-regulatory models in different industries, including 
shipping. It ends with a brief explanation of IMO’s 
International Safety Management Code (ISM) and its 
relevance for cybersecurity.  “The role of technology as a 
regulator”, as the title suggests, briefly explores how 
technological advancements can be helpful in ensuring 
cybersecurity in general. “Cybersecurity in the Danish 
shipping industry: an exploratory study” is where the 
findings on the Danish shipping industry are presented and 
organized according to 4 subcategories or codes. The 
seventh section confronts the findings with the explored 
literatures, thus providing points for discussion. Here, the 
main limitations of this report are also acknowledged. 
Finally, the eighth and final part is devoted to conclusions 
and suggestions for future research.  
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The contributions of this report are situated not only in its 
findings, but also in the way it attempts to promote a 
“dialogue” between different literatures and disciplines 
that are concerned either with cybersecurity, with 
regulation in the shipping industry, or both. This explains 
why this section (methodology) precedes the review of the 
literature. As mentioned, rather than crafting a more 
traditional review of the literature, we sought to 
interweave different literatures and disciplines that could 
contribute to the problem. More specifically, we consulted 
(1) a well consolidated literature on information security 
and cybersecurity in the field of information systems, (2) a 
literature that analyzes information security and 
cybersecurity from the perspective of economics, (3) a 
broad literature on self-regulation, which draws on 
institutional theory and policy studies, and (4) a 
specialized literature that analyzes regulation and safety 
regulation within shipping from either a historical or a 
regulatory perspective. We supplemented the review of 
journal articles and books with publications from media 
outlets, whitepapers (egg. from cybersecurity 
consultancies), position papers (egg. from the International 
Union of Marine Insurers), and reports from consultancies 
and diverse organizations within and outside shipping 
(egg. BIMCO, OECD, Lloyd’s Register, Quinetiq and 
University of Southampton, Danish Ship Finance and 
Rainmaking, Danish Shipping, and Rambøll and Core). 
When analyzing specifically the case of cybersecurity in 
shipping, and particularly the case of Denmark, we started 
by consulting a series of relevant policies and regulations. 
Thereafter, we collected primary data in two ways: first, 
by participating in two subscription-based events promoted 
by the shipping industry, and second, by interviewing 
experts. The first event, titled Cyber Security – threat 
landscape, trends and employee awareness, was organized 
by the Maritime Development Center in Denmark and took 
place in November 2018, at the University of Aalborg’s 
campus in Copenhagen. It comprised of three lectures with 
the following specialists: Morten von Seelen, a senior 
manager at Deloitte’s Cyber Incident Response, Ken 
Munro, a partner of Pen Tests Partners, and Kasper 
Hulgaard, a behavioral consultant and project manager at 
INudge You. These presenters shared their slides after the 
event, and we quote them accordingly.  
The second event was the one-day course offered by the 
Danish Shipping Academy, titled Introduction to the 
Shipping Industry, hosted by Danish Shipping (Danske 
Rederier) in April 2019. The course had the format of 
several short lectures delivered by Danish Shipping staff 
occupying roles such as director, analyst, head of industrial 
relations, and head of legal affairs. Information based on 
notes from the course and shared slides (in print) are 
quoted as Danish Shipping 2019, and do not make 
reference to specific persons.   
Finally, this primary data was supplemented by interviews 
with two cybersecurity specialists (one at a national 
shipping association and another at a private consulting 
company), a security specialist at an international shipping 
association, and a specialist in digitalization at a national 
shipping association. More specifically, in November 2018 
a joint interview of approximately 45 minutes was 
conducted with Asbjørn Overgaard Christiansen, head of 
innovation and Danish Shipping Academy, and Morten 
Glamsø, senior adviser in the field of security, 
environment and maritime research, both at Danish 
Shipping (Danske Rederier). In December of 2018, Lars 
Jensen, a specialist in cybersecurity within shipping and 
founder of the consulting Cyberkeel (now part of Improsec 
Aps), shared his knowledge in an interview that lasted for 
one hour. Jensen had hosted and mediated the Maritime 
Development Center event on cybersecurity a month 
earlier, where a first contact with him was established. In 
April 2019 the opportunity of going to Bagsværd to meet 
Jakob Larsen, head of security at BIMCO, appeared, 
resulting in an interview of approximately 45 minutes. 
Finally, in May 2019, a follow up interview of 
approximately 40 minutes with Morten Glamsø concluded 
the process of primary data collection. All interviews were 
recorded with consent and direct quotes were sent to 
interviewees for purposes of validation. 
After transcribing the interviews and looking at notes and 
other primary sources, findings were organized in 
accordance with the following codes: (1) regulation, self-
regulation and accountability (2) safety, security, and the 
ISM Code, (3) information sharing, awareness and brand 
METHODOLOGY  
  
8 
CR
UI
SI
NG
 D
IG
ITA
LI
ZA
TIO
N 
  
 
sensitivity, (4) security by design, nudging, and the human 
factor. The process through which we arrived at these 
codes was both deductive and inductive. In other words, 
while codes such as “regulation and self-regulation” were 
extracted from the literature, and are what Saunders et al. 
(2016, 582) consider  to be “a priori” codes, other codes 
were adapted or created after assessing the primary 
sources. These are known as “in vivo” codes (Saunders et 
al. 2016, 583) and offer a greater degree of flexibility.  
Finally, for purposes of problem delimitation, it is 
important to mention that the focus here is on 
cybersecurity within vessels, even though some of the 
consulted regulation go beyond vessels and cover port 
infrastructure.  
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It is difficult to explain the meaning of cybersecurity 
without referring, first, to the concept of information 
security. Most definitions of information security refer 
back to the North-American Central Intelligence Agency’s 
(CIA) benchmark model or triad created in the 1970s to 
assess the security of information. The triad emphasizes 
the need of ensuring that information preserves the 
properties of confidentiality (prevention of unauthorized 
access and/or disclosure), integrity (assurance that 
information is accurate, trustworthy and untampered) and 
availability (the guarantee that those who are authorized to 
access it may easily do it). The same parameters are 
reproduced in the 2013 ISO/IEC 27001 standard for 
information security management9, as well as on the 
North-American NIST cybersecurity framework10.  
Contrarily to what some may assume, the concept of 
information security does not apply exclusively to digitally 
stored information. Moreover, it includes both physical 
and logical access controls to ensure “the proper use of 
data and to prohibit unauthorized or accidental 
modification, destruction disclosure, loss or access to 
automated or manual records and files as well as loss, 
damage or misuse of information assets” (Peltier 2001, 
266). Since the end of the 1980s, however, a growing 
focus on digitally stored information started to arise, and 
the concept of information security evolved in consonance 
with digital information systems themselves, thus giving 
rise, as we will see below, to the concept of cybersecurity.  
In 1992 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) issued its first Recommendation 
Concerning Guidelines for the Security of Information 
Systems, directed at both national governments and the 
private sector. This report was based on the recognition 
that building trust in digital information systems was of 
absolute importance given their centrality for trade, as well 
as social, cultural, and social interactions. The paradigm of 
information security at that time was informed by the 
siloed infrastructure of information technology. Security 
thus “focused on internal threats”, and protection against 
the “outside world” was gained through “reinforcing the 
main characteristics of information systems: keeping them 
                                                          
9 https://www.iso.org/standard/54534.html 
 
closed by default and opening them only by exception and 
under tight controls” (OECD 2002, 5).  
The so-called “age of perimeter security” (OECD 2012) of 
the early 1990s was swiftly replaced at the end of the same 
decade due mainly to the wide adoption of internet 
technologies. In this new environment, “seamless 
interoperability and interconnectivity enabled the various, 
previously siloed, IT components of organizations to 
morph into joined-up information systems, within which 
information could flow freely” beyond organizational and 
even national borders (OECD 2012, 6). The transformation 
of the IT infrastructure promoted by the internet, and the 
fact that “breaches of security resulting from attacks on 
data or systems via a connection to an external network or 
system” (Danish Ministry of Finance 2018, 7) were now 
able to occur gave way to an unprecedented expansion of 
economic and social interactions. On the other hand, new 
opportunities for crime also came to the fore, thus giving 
rise to the concept of cybercrime, to which cybersecurity is 
related.  
One of the best means of understanding cybersecurity and 
thus analyzing different governance frameworks 
associated with it is by distinguishing the different 
meanings conflated in the term. One could start by 
differentiating among three broad areas to which 
cybersecurity may apply, namely, national security, 
industrial espionage and cybercrime. These areas “differ 
dramatically in terms of scale, stakeholders, timeframe and 
level of social importance” (Friedman 2011, 2). 
Among the three areas, the case of “national security” is 
quite particular, as actions such as the disruption of a 
nation’s critical infrastructure and attacks against the 
military are extraordinary situations, characterized by a 
high level of social importance, huge scale, very specific 
stakeholders (usually states and terrorist groups) and a 
complex timeframe calculus (Friedman 2011, 2).  
In the cases of industrial espionage and cybercrime scale is 
hard to appraise. If we consider the former, it will become 
clear that “both governments and companies are 
understandably reluctant to disclose details, and thus 
figures are based on assumptions and informed judgments, 
10 https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework 
CLEARING THE WATERS: WHAT IS 
CYBERSECURITY? 
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rather than accurate numbers (Friedman 2011, 3). In the 
case of cybercrime, estimates suffer from the problem of a 
regular conflation of “risks with threats, harms and 
crimes” (Wall 2017, 1083)11.  Usually, what we see in the 
media are estimates concerning risks and threats of 
cybercrime, which display the highest numbers but say 
little about actual harms to the victims. In spite of this 
tendency to “over-sensationalize”, cybercrime may 
paradoxically go underreported, either because victims 
such as businesses prefer not to report them, or because 
they are prosecuted under different laws.  
Regarding the level of social importance of cybercrime, it 
is important to keep in mind that the idea of “zero crime” 
is illusory, and that a certain level of fraud “has become a 
built-in expense in most business models that rely on the 
internet (Friedman 2011, 4). As a matter of fact, “there is a 
trade-off between fraud reduction and enabling 
transactions such as e-commerce”, and both governments 
and businesses need to take in a certain marginal cost of 
attacks as the “cost of doing business” (Friedman 2011, 4). 
Specifically with regard to espionage, the idea of the long-
term competitiveness of national industries should be 
considered, as the stealing of intellectual property might 
affect the long-term interests of companies, shareholders 
and society as a whole.   
Different from Friedman, Wall (2017, 1081-1083) assesses 
cybercrime in accordance with three variables: (1) the 
importance of technology as a mediator, (2) the modus 
operandi, and (3) the victims. In order to measure the first 
variable he suggests a so-called “transformation test”, 
which consists of metaphorically or actually “removing” 
the mediating technology from the crime in order to assess 
“what is left”. The result could be any one of three 
different categories of crime: at the two opposite ends one 
would have either the cyber-assisted crime, which is the 
crime that profits from the internet but would still take 
place without its existence, or the cyber-dependent crime, 
which only exists because of the internet. In the category 
in between one could list a number of cyber-enabled 
crimes, which are “existing crimes in law” and which are 
now acquiring a more global nature due to the use of 
networked systems. The “modus operandi” variable, in 
turn, appraises whether a cybercrime was a “crime against 
the machine” (i..e an attack targeted at computer 
networks), a crime that “uses the machine” (i.e. fraud), or a 
“crime in the machine” (i.e., hate speech online).  Finally, 
it is also important to differentiate among types of victims, 
                                                          
11 According to Wall (2018, 1083), risks are things that “in theory could 
happen, such as a meteorite that might destroy life on earth”. Threats, in 
turn, “are those risks that are in circulation at any one time, such as 
meteorites flying around the cosmos but no necessarily hitting anything”. 
which can be categorized into individuals, nation states 
and organizations.  
A category that is not mentioned in any of the typologies 
above refers to perpetrators and their motivations. Von 
Seelen (2018) tackles this by listing the following 
perpetrators and pairing them up with common 
motivations: (1) criminals/ financial gain, (2) Hackers/ 
curiosity or fame, (3) Hacktivists/ affect public opinion or 
company behavior, (4) insiders/ disagreements or profits, 
(5) competitors / gain competitive advantage, (6) nation 
states / political and security concerns, and (6) accidents / 
accidental.  
Depending on how one frames the problem, however, the 
category of “insiders” – with diverse or no motivation – 
encompasses all the others. This is the argument made by 
Arduin (2018).  For him, regardless of the structure of 
information systems (i.e., whether they are siloed or 
networked) their main threat factor is “human and 
internal” (Arduin 2018, 62). This happens because while 
codes, procedures, and infrastructures are effective in 
protecting “computer systems”, they are not sufficient in 
guaranteeing the security of “information systems” 
because the latter include a crucial and yet highly 
unpredictable component, namely, humans, or individuals, 
who may, or may not, behave rationally. Here it is 
important to understand that violations to organizational 
security policies can be of diverse nature, and the author 
distinguishes between three categories of violations 
(Arduin 2018, 65): 
1) un-intentional, that is, “wrong actions” carried out 
unconsciously by employees either due to inexperience or 
negligence, or because they were manipulated by an 
attacker. An example here would be the deletion of 
sensitive data.  
2) intentional and non-malicious, that is, wrong actions 
that are deliberately taken by employees, such as deferring 
updates and backups or choosing weak passwords, which 
are made with the purpose of derive a benefit (for 
example, saving time), but which have no intention to 
cause harm.  
3) intentional and malicious, which refer to deliberate 
actions caused by employees with a desire to cause harm, 
such as divulging sensitive data.  
The main aspect that distinguishes the first and second 
categories in this typology seems to be “unawareness” of 
policy violation. Regarding the second and third, the 
difference lies in the intention to cause harm, although the 
Harms and crimes, however, are something of a different nature, since 
they actually refer to a violation of the law (crime) even if actual harm 
was not done. 
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intention to derive a benefit from the action (present in 2 
but not always present in 3) may also contribute to making 
the second category blameworthy from a moral standpoint.  
Arduin’s (2018) insistence in the importance of the 
“human element” in ensuring information security is 
echoed by several other information systems scholars, who 
claim that a focus on technological solutions, system’s 
components (software and hardware) and systems 
solutions is far from sufficient (see, for instance, Boss et 
al. 2009, Herath and Rao 2009). These scholars argue for 
the need to heed formal and informal control mechanisms, 
including policies, procedures, organizational culture, and 
the role individuals play in security (Herath and Rao 2009, 
106, see also Pahnila et al. 2007).  In other words, there is 
both the need to develop security policies (Dutta and 
McCrohan 2002) and to motivate individuals within the 
organization to comply. The latter usually requires a 
serious commitment on the part of management, and 
maybe even the perception on the part of individuals that 
their actions contribute to the organization.  
For Boss et al. 2009, one of the variables that most 
contributes to ensuring cybersecurity is “mandatoriness”, 
which refer to the degree to which “individuals perceive 
that compliance with existing security policies and 
procedures is compulsory or expected by organizational 
management” (Boss et al. 2009, 152). Among the findings 
of their study, one should highlight: (1) that acts of 
specifying policies and evaluating behaviors are effective 
in convincing individuals that security policies are 
mandatory, (2) that the perception of mandatoriness is 
effective in motivating individuals to take security 
precautions and, most importantly, (3) that if individuals 
believe that management is watching, they will comply.  
The incentive of actors to engage in criminal behavior 
online are diverse. Still, the idea of creating destructive 
code just for the sake of disruption seems to be decreasing 
in what Wall (2017, 1079) calls a “post-script kiddie 
world”. In other words, one should “model today’s 
cybercriminal as an actor seeking some goal” (Friedman 
2011, 6); not so much as a teenager performing a rite of 
passage. To that extent, the main incentives left are either 
financial or political. When speaking of the former one 
could refer to those engaged in “economy of scale” types 
of crime. Here, assisted by the automation of digital 
technologies, which are lowering the “entry level skills of 
cybercrime”, criminals commit a large amount of small 
crimes, with an individual low return, but which also incur 
in lower risk of being caught and punished (Wall 2017, 
                                                          
12 Here, it is important to notice that cybercrime and information security 
belong to two different, though interdependent, markets (Bauer and Eeten 
20019, 717). 
1078-9). At a different level of gain lie crimes targeted at 
industrial espionage, intellectual property theft and similar 
issues. Finally, actors with non-financial or political 
incentives can be anything from “white hat” hackers and 
“hacktivists”, to cyberterrorists, or someone who wants to 
harm a firm’s reputation, even without deriving any 
financial gains from it.  
While the incentives of engaging in cybercrime may be 
clear, incentives for enhancing cyber security at the 
individual or organizational level are a bit more complex, 
and thus invite the question of the extent to which 
regulation, or interference with the market, are necessary 
in this field12.  Here, it is important to ask whether 
individual information security decisions reflect social 
benefits and costs, that is to say, if they result in an 
“overall desirable outcome” for society, which is “a 
tolerable level of cybercrime, a desirable level of security” 
(Bauer and Eeten 2009, 707). If some of the costs are 
borne by other stakeholders or some of the benefits accrue 
to other players (i.e., they are “externalized”), individual 
security decisions do not properly reflect social benefits 
and costs. Another way to put this is that “private network 
owners” do not completely internalize the risks of not 
protecting themselves adequately, nor do they completely 
internalize the benefits. 
For Dourado and Britto (2012), although network security 
has positive externalities that private network owners 
cannot internalize, this does not amount to a market failure 
and, therefore, does not necessarily require governmental 
interference. For them, private firms, due to “self-
interested reasons” are already investing a lot in security 
precautions and thus providing enough positive 
externalities. Therefore, there is no market failure and thus 
regulation is redundant.  
Another means to appraise this scenario is by focusing on 
negative externalities (Bauer and Eeten 2009). In the case 
of highly interdependent information and communication 
systems such as the internet, although the security 
decisions of a market player regarding malware might be 
rational for that player, given the costs and benefits it 
perceives, the resulting course of action inadvertently or 
deliberately imposes costs on other market players and on 
society at large. Decentralized individual decisions will 
therefore not result in a socially “optimal level of 
security”, and therefore require some regulatory 
interference. In other words, although one can see a 
number of instances in which “market-based incentive 
mechanisms that enhance security” are working, there are 
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also instances in which decentralized actions are afflicted 
by externalities and thus suboptimal outcomes (Bauer and 
Eeten 2009, 713).  
The idea of comparing cybersecurity with locking your 
own home (Dourado and Britto 2012) might not provide 
an accurate analogy here, as in this case there are not so 
many negative externalities, or at least they are not so 
direct. Alternatively, a comparison with vaccines and 
vaccination programs makes more sense (Mital 2015). In 
this case, there are positive externalities when individuals 
vaccinate (in the sense that non-vaccinated individuals are 
also protected by default) and, conversely, negative 
externalities when individuals refrain from doing so (to the 
extent that they may get sick and represent a social cost, as 
well as contaminate others). Similarly, “unvaccinated” 
computers represent substantial negative externalities 
associated with the potential and realized threat of millions 
of compromised PCs - thus the rationality of comparing 
cybersecurity with a “public health issue”, which requires 
some degree of governmental interference or at least 
coordination (Mital 2015, 3). 
Modeling cybersecurity as an economic problem will 
directly lead us into a discussion on regulation, which is 
the main focus of this report. After all, if a problem of 
collective action or a prisoner’s dilemma type of situation 
is at stake, some sort of coordination might be important. 
In the next section, we approach the topic of regulation 
directly in reference to the maritime shipping industry.  
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Globalization and global capitalism are far from new 
phenomena. And yet few industries can claim to have 
“global” inscribed into their DNA to the same degree as 
the maritime. Indeed, it was through technologies of 
navigation that globalization itself came into being: 
civilizations crossed oceans to come into contact with 
other ways of living, and capitalism and the nation-state as 
we know them today begun to take form.  
The fact that the maritime industry is global and broad 
translates, among other things into a complex, multi-
layered and at times juxtaposed regulatory structure. 
Regulation in the shipping industry combines the efforts 
of, on the one hand, political actors (egg. flag state 
administrations, port state authorities and international 
legislative bodies) and, on the other, private actors 
(classification societies, P&I clubs, trade unions, industry 
associations). These actors may, in turn, be based 
nationally/locally, regionally or internationally. 
Maritime shipping, in particular, abounds with regulatory 
challenges, not the least because ships spend much of their 
time in international waters, outside of the reach of 
regulators (Almklov & Lamvik 2018, 176). For this 
reason, and given the global nature of the industry, the 
need for “international co-ordination” is conspicuous 
(Walters and Bailey 2013, 2009). It therefore makes sense 
that the bulk of relevant regulation in the shipping industry 
departs from the walls of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), a body of the United Nations that 
came into existence in 1958.  
The history of regulation in the maritime industry refers 
back to XIX century England, and more specifically to the 
efforts of private actors. These actors were marine 
underwriters and brokers who, faced with increasing ship 
losses, and the need to manage risk, introduced a system of 
rating for ships, which in turn gave birth to the so-called 
classification societies (Walters and Bailey 2013, 98-99). 
Even before that, however, nation-states were already 
taking timid steps to regulate life at sea. In Danish history, 
state promulgated maritime law can be traced all the way 
                                                          
13 Retrieved in 2 November 2018 from Danish Maritime Authority 
website. 
https://www.dma.dk/OmOs/VoresHistorie/NedslagSoefartshistorie/Sider/
default.aspx 
back to year 1651, when Frederik the Second introduced 
the First Maritime Law, which sat rules for the relationship 
between masters and ship owners (Danish Maritime 
Authority 2018)13.  In the case of Britain, the state’s 
entrance into the business of regulating the maritime 
industry occurred officially in 1850, through the 
promulgation of the first Merchant Shipping Act “in 
response to unprecedented numbers of losses of ships and 
sailors” (Walters and Bailey, 2013, 100). 
The fast development of world trade in the XX century 
made the regulation of shipping at the international level 
necessary. What begun as bilateral agreements between 
shipping nations led, after the tragedy of the Titanic in 
1912, to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention; 
the first and still “most important of all international 
treaties concerning the safety of merchant ships”14.  The 
1974 version of the Convention, which has since then 
received several amendments, establishes “minimum 
standards for the construction, equipment and operation of 
ships, compatible with their safety”15, and leaves to the so-
called Flag States the responsibility of ensuring 
compliance. SOLAS is usually depicted as the first step 
towards the creation of the IMO, which was established 
through a convention in 1948 (originally under the name 
of International Maritime Consultative Organization, 
IMCO), and entered into force in 1958, as a part of the 
United Nations. Besides the IMO, another international 
actor that plays a crucial role in regulating the maritime 
industry is the International Labor Organization (ILO), 
which focuses mainly on the safety and wellbeing of 
seafarers (Danish Shipping 2019). Due to the scope of this 
report, however, a focus on the role of the IMO is more 
relevant.  
In spite of the IMO’s weight in the maritime regulatory 
landscape, the clout of “flag states”, which are the states 
wherein ships are registered, should not be ignored. States, 
and especially those with more leverage in the industry, 
not only are key players in shaping international 
conventions within the IMO, but also have a crucial role in 
14 Retrieved in 29 October 2019 from the IMO website. 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Int
ernational-Convention-for-the-Safety-of-Life-at-Sea-(SOLAS),-
1974.aspx 
15 Ibid. 
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implementing and enforcing them, thus bringing into the 
picture an element of political realism. As it is the case 
with all international conventions, they have to be 
incorporated into national legislation, and it is the state that 
is responsible for implementation and enforcement. Thus, 
it is at this stage of the regulatory process that concerns 
regarding the achievement of a level playing field may 
emerge.  
As known, the shipping industry struggles to find solutions 
to the problem of so-called “flags of convenience”, “open 
registers” and the practice of “flagging out”, which started 
in the 1980s due to the economic crisis that affected 
maritime shipping. We will not speak much about these 
issues, as they have been described at length by several 
scholars (see, for instance, DeSombre 2006). For the 
purposes of this report, it remains sufficient to mention 
that the relative “mobility” that flagging out has given to 
ship owners, in terms of allowing them to choose which 
regulatory regime their vessel will belong to, has 
represented challenges in the sense of providing a level 
playing field among states, and avoiding a “race to the 
bottom” (Almklov and Lamvik 2018, 176).  
As a counterpoint, port state authorities have been granted 
the power to “board ships that enter their ports and inspect 
them for compliance with various international 
conventions” (Walters and Bailey 2013, 117), even when 
the state to which the flag is registered is not a signatory. 
This is known as the “no more favourable movement”. 
Another important development in this direction are the 
so-called Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs), 
created to coordinate enforcement strategies among 
states16.   
The widespread idea that flags of convenience create 
regulatory and market distortions that may produce 
harmful consequences for the environment and for vessel 
safety has, however, been disputed. The study by 
Winchester and Alderton (2002), for instance, makes the 
case that registries that are too lax with regards to 
international regulation cease to be attractive in the long 
term, as they tend to be disproportionally targeted by 
inspection regimes. In brief, most “flag states today 
enforce a minimum of regulation and regimes of 
inspection to keep the ship in compliance with 
international standards” (Almklov & Lamvik 2018, 177, 
see also DeSombre 2006).  
                                                          
16 16 A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is an administrative 
agreement between authorities. In the shipping industry the first MOU 
was the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control. It 
was crafted in the wake of a major oil spil in the coast of France in 1978, 
which led to demands for stricter regulation. It was signed in January 
The meaning of the word regulation is rather contested, 
and may refer to a spectrum that covers both traditional 
“command-and-control” or deterrence-oriented legal 
approaches, which are centered on the state, and broader 
ideas of employing authority (stemming from sources as 
diverse as the law, market, social norms and even 
technology) to shape behavior (Brownsword et al. 2017, 6, 
se also Black 2001).  Still, when we think of 
environmental protection, health and safety, traditional 
ideas of state-centered regulation are predominant. More 
specifically, there is “common agreement in Western 
societies that a legislative framework is needed to guide 
industrial behavior and to guarantee rights for workers, as 
well as for the environment” (Aalders and Wilthagen 
1997, 42), since market mechanisms are insufficient. 
Despite this relative consensus on the greater effectiveness 
of deterrence-oriented legal approaches in the fields of 
health and safety and environmental protection, “less than 
traditional” formats of regulation have also been tested and 
approved.  
Historically, alternatives to command-and-control were 
developed in all policy fields in the Western world in 
association with a wider criticism of the interventionist 
state and its social and economic costs.  As Zuboff (2019) 
recounts, the stagnation and inflation that engulfed the 
postwar West formed the perfect environment for the 
neoliberal discourse of rolling back the state.  
 
The free market creed originated in Europe as a sweeping 
defense against the threat of totalitarian and communist 
collectivist ideologies. It aimed to revive acceptance of a 
self-regulating market as a natural force of such 
complexity and perfection that it demanded radical 
freedom from all forms of state oversight (Zuboff 2019, 
38). 
 
It was also in this context that the theory of “shareholder 
capitalism” emerged. Its authors, inspired by free market 
proponents such as Friedman and Hayek, identified a gap 
between the interests and preferences of managers (agents) 
and the interests and preferences of shareholders 
(principal). Such gap, although rational from the point of 
view of managers, was problematic because it lowered the 
value of the firm and harmed the wealth of shareholders. 
The solution was then to “assert the market’s signal of 
value, the share price, as the basis for a new incentive 
1982 by fourtneen European countries and entered in operation in July 
1982. It has been amended several times since then, and now counts with 
27 signatories. Other MOUs have been created since then. Retrieved from 
the Paris MOU website in October 30, 2019. (https://www.parismou.org/) 
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structure intended to finally and decisively align 
managerial behavior with owners’ interests” (Zuboff 2019, 
39).   
In spite of the influence of shareholder theory, 
counterpoints to the idea that businesses should merely 
aim at increasing the wealth of their owners did not take 
long to appear. The theory of stakeholder capitalism, for 
instance, departed from the principle that the organization 
“sits in a wider social context” and therefore needs to heed 
moral values and consider the interests of all of its 
stakeholders, even if “out of enlightened self-interest” 
(Aalders and Wilthagen 1997, 434). The perception, which 
lies at the heart of the concept of corporate social 
responsibility, that corporations should have “clearly 
articulated and communicated policies and practices (that) 
reflect business responsibility for some of the wider 
societal good” (Matten and Moon 2008, 405) became 
widely accepted, despite variations in configuration. In this 
context “doing justice in the workplace for employees, 
manufacturing safe products for consumers, caring for the 
environment, enhancing (rather than maximizing) 
shareholder value, and so on” became part of the agenda 
(Gunningham and Rees 1997, 375).  
Interestingly, stakeholder capitalism, or the principle that 
firms are also accountable to society at large, is not 
necessarily associated with a dull defense of pure 
regulation and command and control frameworks, being in 
tune with different self-regulatory and co-regulatory 
models, including the idea of the “social responsibility” of 
the firm and “enterprise liability”. As a sensible solution to 
regulatory overload, self-regulation may be seen as a 
“middle way between laissez-faire capitalism and state-
centered regulation”, which might be efficient in 
“bring(ing) the behavior of industry members within a 
normative ordering responsive to broader social values” 
(Gunningham and Rees 1997, 364). Moreover, its goal is 
to ensure that “firms or their associations, in their 
undertaking of business activities, ensure that unacceptable 
consequences to the environment, the workforce or 
consumers and clients, are avoided” (Gunningham and 
Rees 1997, 365). 
The OECD has similarly defined industry self-regulation 
(ISR) as an efficient and less costly mechanism for 
“addressing consumer issues, particularly when business 
codes of conduct and standards are involved” (OECD 
1997,5). In one of its reports on the topic, it describes ISR 
as the result of agreements between groups of firms in a 
particular industry or entire industry sector to act in 
determined ways. These groups “can be wholly 
responsible for developing the self-regulatory instruments, 
monitoring compliance and ensuring enforcement, or they 
can work with government entities and other stakeholders 
in these areas, in a co-regulatory capacity” (OECD 1997, 
11). 
As suggested above, “there is no clear dichotomy between 
self-regulation, on the one hand, and government 
regulation, on the other”, especially because pure forms of 
private regulation (wherein both rule making and 
enforcement are done by the firm or industry) rarely exist 
(Gunningham and Rees 1997, 365). Conversely, 
governments are important agents in the wide range of 
“configurations” that characterize their partnerships with 
businesses in promoting acts that are socially responsible 
(Gond et al. 2011).Thus it is more productive “to think in 
terms of typologies of social control, ranging from detailed 
government command and control regulation to “pure” 
self-regulation, with different points of the continuum 
encapsulating various kinds of co-regulation” 
(Gunningham and Rees 1997, 366). In the case of 
corporate social responsibility, for instance, configurations 
may vary between “self-government (voluntary and non-
enforceable) or as an alternative form of government 
(substitute for government), but also as self-reegulation 
which is facilitated by government, coordinated in 
partnerships with government, and mandated (…) by 
government” (Gond et al. 2011, 642). 
As previously mentioned, the idea that self-regulation, 
understood as delegation of government authority to 
industrial associations and firms, can become an 
alternative to the centralization of regulatory authority in 
the state, has been discussed and tested in the fields of 
occupational safety and health and the environment. 
Aalders and Wilthagen (1997), whose study focuses on 
land-based self-regulation in these fields, provide an 
interesting comparison between them. They claim, for 
instance, that it is more easy to identify “interests, 
objectives, and structure of the actors” in the field of 
occupational safety and health than in the environmental 
area. This is the case because individuals have difficulty 
understanding their role as polluters and thus assuming 
responsibility. On the other hand, both employers and 
employees usually see themselves as responsible for safety 
and health. Second, the fact that pollution and the 
environment often have “transboundary consequences”, 
turn them into very particular and less visible political 
questions, to the contrast of safety issues, which are rather 
well circumscribed (Aalders and Wilthagen 1997, 418). 
Somewhat paradoxically, however, the authors themselves 
cite different studies that draw attention to the fact that 
effective “self-regulation” within safety and health has 
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clear limits. For one thing, in order to work properly, it 
requires a high level of commitment, knowledge and 
motivation on the part of employees and, especially the 
commitment of senior executives and line managers. In 
other words effective self-regulation within safety requires 
employees to be active in identifying hazards, monitoring 
and implementing controls“.More importantly, “without it 
being externally forced on them, people will often not take 
matters of safety and health seriously until they come into 
contact with severe injury or death” (Aalders and 
Wilthagen 1997, 421).  
In the same special number of the journal Policy and Law 
that Gunningham and Rees presented their comprehensive 
assessment of self-regulation, Furger (1997) conveys his 
detailed study of self-governance systems within the 
maritime industry. He makes the claim that government 
regulation is not the only source of accountability, and that 
private institutions or “intermediary organizations”, which 
do not necessarily follow jurisdictional lines, such as trade 
associations, protection and indemnity clubs, marine 
underwriters, classification societies and trade unions, may 
contribute as much as traditional regulators to the goals of 
safety and environmental protection within the global 
maritime industry. As an example, he cites Intertanko, the 
International Association of Independent tanker owners. 
This association offers a series of services to its members, 
but only upon the condition that they comply to strict 
requirements concerning safety and security (Furger 1997, 
454). 
Another example of self-regulation, this time pointed by 
different authors, is the Norwegian petroleum industry. 
This national industry is a successful example of self-
regulation as a tool to countering the so-called “race to the 
bottom”, which refers to a competition on who offers the 
lowest requirements. According to Almklov and Lamvik 
(2018, 181), there are incentives for petroleum companies 
“to go beyond minimal demands” or standards required by 
law. This is the case because “accidents and 
nonconformities in all parts of the value chain will be 
closely associated with the company operating the 
petroleum production licence” (Almklov and Lamvik 
2018, 181). In other words, reputation and public image 
come into play, even when we are speaking of an industry 
that does not deal directly with consumers.   
Finally, one example that is often cited in the broader 
literature on self-regulation within safety is that of the 
nuclear energy industry in the United States (Barnkenbus 
                                                          
17 Retrived from the IMO website in October 29th 2019. 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/HumanElement/SafetyManagement/Pa
ges/ISMCode.aspx 
18 Ibid. 
1983, Ellis Jr. 2015). In this case, scholars refer to the 
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), an industry 
association created in the wake of the 1979 Three Mile 
Island nuclear accident by the nuclear utility industry 
itself. The main roles of INPO are: the gathering, 
evaluating and sharing of information between all plants, 
on-site periodic evaluation and review with utility 
executives of performance, training of employees, setting 
standards and guidelines, job evaluation criteria, and 
examination of utility emergency preparedness plans 
(Barkenbus 1983, 584). 
Although nuclear power plants are under no obligation to 
join INPO, it is widely acknowledged that the American 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission would never approve an 
unaffiliated plant. INPO and the National Regulatory 
Commission work together and depend on one another, to 
the extent that the latter deals with designing regulation, 
while the former focuses on the “operation side of things, 
the safety”, thus producing a co-regulatory framework of 
governance (Ellis Jr. 2015). Moreover, INPO focuses on 
promoting a culture of safety, and building common 
standards and expectations for a safety culture, and focuses 
mainly on the involvement of top management (Ellis Jr. 
2015). Also important is the fact that INPO’s grading of 
the level of safety of a power plant translates directly into 
insurance premiums.  
Going back to shipping, in spite of Furger’s (1997) 
innovative attempt to reveal self-governance mechanisms 
within the shipping industry, his study gives little attention 
to one of the main parameters for safety and environmental 
protection within the shipping industry, namely, the 
International Safety Management (ISM) Code, which is 
also where cyber risk management is included. The ISM 
code has the purpose of providing an “international 
standard for the safe management and operation of ships 
and for pollution prevention”17.  Its origins refer back to 
the late 1980s, when a series of maritime accidents caused 
by cost cutting took place and action at the international 
level was deemed necessary. Also importantly, such 
accidents were assigned to “errors on the part of 
management”18.  The code thus establishes “safety-
management objectives and requires safety management 
system (SMS) to be established by the “company”, which 
is defined as the owner or any other organization or person 
(…) who has assumed responsibility for operating the 
ship”19.  The ISM code became a part of the SOLAS 
convention20  in 1994, which means that its application is 
19 Ibid. 
20 Retrived from the IMO website in 30 March 2019. 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Int
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mandatory by signatory states. It progressed slowly from 
including only ro-ro passenger ferries to covering all types 
of merchant vessels over 500 gross tonnage by 2002 
(Danish Shipping 2019).  
The ISM code should not be seen as “an isolated 
provision”, but rather as part of a “wider development of 
regulated self-regulation of health and safety management” 
(Walters and Bailey 2013, 130), which denotes a 
combination of government and private/voluntary 
initiatives. By the 1960s and 1970s, “command and 
control” approaches to health and safety had started to 
show signs of exhaustion. Side by side with this, there was 
a movement in the direction of adopting voluntary 
approaches to organizational health and safety 
management, partly encouraged by the development of 
quality standards and the Total Quality Management 
movement. These “land-based” experiences had a 
profound effect in “the development of systematic 
approaches to health and safety management at sea”, 
including the development of the ISM code (Walters and 
Bailey 2013, 134).  
The code, similarly to its land-based counterparts, puts 
considerable emphasis on the “human aspect” or human 
element of accidents, rather than on technological or 
equipment failure. Consequently, the improvement of 
management systems, and the introduction of a safety 
awareness culture are seen as the key to more safety. The 
ISM code, which is concerned both with the environment 
and safety, is based on six functional requirements: (1) a 
safety and environmental-protection policy, (2) procedures 
regarding the safe operation of ships and environmental 
protection in tune with international and national 
legislation, (3) clearly defined levels of authority and lines 
of communication between and among shore and 
shipboard personnel, (4) clear procedures for reporting 
accidents and non-conformities, (5) emergency response 
procedures and (6) internal audit and management review 
procedures (Walters and Bailey 2013, 137). Within this 
system of responsibility attribution, the ship master carries 
the largest amount of responsibility for ensuring the 
application of the code (Danish Shipping 2019).  
It is also important to understand how the code is 
implemented, as outlined in its part B. The code requires 
that, in order to operate, a company has to be issued a 
“Document of Compliance” (DOC) or an Interim DOC. 
These are valid for 5 years and are specific to each ship. 
Ships must also have a Safety Management Certificate, 
which assures that companies are operating the ship in 
                                                          
ernational-Convention-for-the-Safety-of-Life-at-Sea-(SOLAS),-
1974.aspx 
accordance to the “approved safety-management system” 
(Walter and Bailey 2003, 40). Verification of DOCs and 
SMCs with regards to their validity may be done either by 
national maritime authorities or delegated to classification 
societies, consultants or other flag state administrations.  
Now that we have a more or less clear picture of general 
issues concerning cybersecurity and its regulation, as well 
as general aspects of regulation in the shipping industry, 
we can move into the last section that precedes the 
exploration of the Danish case, namely, the section which 
discusses the role of technology as a regulator.  
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As mentioned above, there is a fair amount of consensus in 
the literature about the fact that there “are no direct 
technical solutions to addressing systematic risk”, since it 
is also “a natural side effect of complex systems” 
(Friedman 2011, 1). Still, technology, design, and artefacts 
in general can perform the role of “regulators” by leading 
(or even coercing) humans towards certain (desirable) 
course of action and behaviors – egg. speedbumps 
physically preventing a vehicle from exceeding speed 
limits. Technology can also be its own “regulator” or be 
“secure by design”, such as in the case of software that 
automatically updates.   
The term “techno-regulation”, created at the interface of 
the disciplines of IT law, science and technology studies 
and philosophy, refers basically to the use of technologies 
or artefacts to enforce socially desirable behavior 
(Brownsword  et al. 2017, Yeung 2017), and has a strong 
basis on Lessig’s (1999) principle that “code is law”, as 
well as on Winner’s (1986) idea that technology has 
inherent politics.  The main point of technoregulation, 
however, is to push or even coerce humans into taking 
desirable/law-abiding/moral courses of action. Thus it is 
more closely related with “nudging” than with security by 
design solutions. In the case hereby discussed, it could 
amount, for instance, to promoting positive behavior (i.e. 
an email from management thanking employees who 
heeded information security policies) and giving feedback, 
investing on visual communication, and behavioral 
changes through training (Hulgaard 2018). As described 
by Yeung (2017,3), “one of the greatest attractions of 
utilizing technology to tackle social problems lies in the 
potential to achieve its behavioral objectives with 100 per 
cent effectiveness and in circumstances where design is 
self-enforcing so that no human intermediation is required 
to secure compliance with desired standards”. This means, 
among other things, the recognition that humans are prone 
to error and that human behavior is unpredictable. In the 
case of cybersecurity, this becomes even more apparent, 
due to vulnerabilities that can result from “lapses in 
cyberdiscipline” (IMO 2017b), or from the reckless 
conducts of individuals, such as in the cases above 
described by Arduin (2018). 
Artificial intelligence, for instance, while bringing its own 
challenges in terms of cybersecurity, may also enhance it 
in unprecedented ways, since “security techniques that 
range from phishing detection and surveillance systems to 
fundamental cryptographic algorithms are becoming 
increasingly powerful and intelligent with the help of AI” 
(Fang et al. 2018, 2). Still, important distinctions should be 
made between “security by design” types of solution (for 
example, systems that update or backup automatically, 
segmenting networks, or enforcing strong passwords), the 
use of technologies such as AI in the detection of 
cybersecurity threats, and something in the vein of 
“techno-regulation”. The latter amounts to using 
technology to direct or even “nudge” human behavior, so 
that it is headed into the expected direction.  
After having considered the elements of regulation, self-
regulation and technoregulation in the literature, and 
provided a brief account of information security, it is now 
appropriate to move into the findings or analysis, which 
focuses on the exploration of the Danish case.  
THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY AS A 
REGULATOR  
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In the beginning of 2019, the Danish Maritime Authority 
released its Cyber and Information Security Strategy for 
the Maritime Sector, a three-year plan associated with the 
Danish Ministry of Finance’s 2018-2021 Cyber and 
Information Security Strategy. In the latter, the maritime 
sector was considered as one out of six “critical sectors” 
deserving of a specific sectoral strategy in the field of 
information and cyber security. This policy focus on 
cybersecurity, more broadly, and on cybersecurity in 
shipping, in particular, is in tune with Denmark’s pride in 
digitalization, and the importance of maritime shipping for 
the national economy21.  And yet, it is worth noticing that 
the national governance framework is closely connected 
with a wider international co-regulatory structure. This 
became evident throughout an analysis of the primary data 
collected for this project, which is here organized into 4 
interconnected codes or categories, namely (1) “regulation, 
self-regulation and accountability”, (2) “safety, security 
and the ISM code”, (3) “information sharing, awareness 
and brand sensitivity” and (4) “security by design, nudging 
and the human factor”. As mentioned in the methodology 
section, these codes were developed with the assistance of 
theories and categories in the literature, but adapted on the 
basis of the primary data itself. These categories are 
hopefully able to provide us with a clearer picture of the 
governance framework for cybersecurity in the Danish 
shipping industry.  
 
REGULATION, SELF-REGULATION AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
One of the points that have repeatedly come up in the 
interviews and other sources consulted for this research 
refers to the importance and effectiveness of regulation 
within the shipping industry. In the particular case of 
cybersecurity in vessels, this happens not the least because 
regulation sets up “minimum requirements”, or a 
“common ground”, amidst a sea of different levels of 
“technological readiness” on the part of shipowners 
(Christiansen 2018). Since organizations within the 
                                                          
21 There are many evidences of the seriousness with which digitalization 
is taken up in the Danish shipping industry. In 2018, for instance, the then 
Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen 
shipping industry “are very diverse” in terms of their 
reliance on IT and investment on digitalization, regulation 
becomes even more important in the sense of ensuring a 
minimum degree of safety of systems. Conversely, 
regulation could also be seen as a “driver of innovation”, 
to the extent that it may push towards “better technical 
solutions to problems such as cyberthreats” (Christiansen 
2018).    
The ubiquity of regulation in maritime shipping is pretty 
straightforward. After all, “if a ship does not follow 
standards it won’t be classified, and thus it will be 
detained…. So there is absolutely not a chance” (to stray 
from regulation) (Glamsø 2018). Here, although 
classification societies may have an indirect role in 
regulation, at the end it is states that are the main points of 
accountability. This happens, among other things, because 
the regulatory structure is based on international 
conventions that are implemented by states, and which aim 
at offering a level playing field (Glamsø 2018).  
Although regulation is a powerful tool in promoting a level 
playing field, it could also work in the opposite direction, 
so that “some players are favored at the expense of others” 
(Larsen 2019). Avoiding this imbalance is at the heart of 
what an organization such as BIMCO does, to the extent 
that it “tries to be that voice among the regulators that 
explains (…) the impacts of a given piece of legislation”. 
That is, “how can you arrange a piece of legislation so that 
it works in the market, and is effective without creating an 
unlevel playing field” (Larsen 2019). 
A good illustration here is that of short deadlines for 
implementing new rules for technical installations on 
board. Short deadlines might do harm to a shipowner with 
a large fleet of older vessels, whereas shipowners who tend 
to build new vessels can more easily adapt their 
newbuildings to the rules. Therefore, reasonable deadlines 
for implementation, which offer “time to adapt” or allows 
for “grandfathering” of existing vessels, are crucial 
(Larsen 2019).  
As mentioned before, one of the most important tools for 
achieving a level playing field is international regulation 
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crafted at the IMO, as it sets the same rules for all 
signatory parties. Still, jurisdictions with sufficient 
political and economic clout have been able to enforce 
their own rules. The examples of the United States after 
the 9/11 attacks is telling (Jensen 2018). Pressed by this 
paradigm changer event, the country was able to enforce 
regulation demanding that shipping lines list the content of 
containers onboard ships with at least 24 hours prior to 
leaving port towards that country. The weight of this 
political actor shouldn’t be ignored here: “because the US 
is as big as it is, and as important as it is, the rule went into 
effect and everybody complied” (Jensen 2018). 
Although special or particular national rules might be 
important in some cases (egg. for protecting a particular 
maritime ecosystem), these should not be abused, as it 
might be quite confusing for ship owners.  
 
Compare to driving on the road….If every time you went 
to a new country you had different traffic signs and new 
rules (…) it would be really difficult to be a truck driver. 
(Therefore,) it makes sense to try to keep the same rules, 
(and then) you can (even) set a high standard, as long as it 
is the same (for all) (Larsen 2019).  
 
Moving now into the field of self-regulation, it is 
interesting to note that in its 2011 report on cyber risks 
within the maritime sector, ENISA (2011, 14) makes the 
claim that “self-regulatory and co-regulatory 
organizational models around maritime cyber security” are 
not only “virtually non-existent” within the EU, but also 
“inadequate in this particular case”. Such claim was 
echoed by the informants who, while advocating for the 
need for regulation have, conversely, shown at least some 
degree of skepticism towards the idea of self-regulation. 
On the other hand, they did acknowledge the importance 
and effectiveness of initiatives such as BIMCO et al.’s 
guidelines, even if these were by no means associated with 
mandatory compliance, that is, “external auditing of 
vetting (of) the individual company’s and ship’s approach 
to cyber risk management” (BIMCO et al. 2018, 4).  
Apparently, the skepticism regarding self-regulation is 
associated with the perception that, in the absence of 
enforcement and punishment for violators, most 
organizations will not voluntarily comply with 
requirements – unless, of course, they can be translated 
into savings. For Jensen (2018) the matter is “at heart” 
simple: “if you save money by doing something, it will 
self-regulate”. If not, “if it is mandated by law, and the law 
                                                          
22 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Guide_to_Maritime_Security/
Pages/Cyber-security.aspx 
is enforced (both things have to occur!), then it gets done. 
Otherwise it doesn’t”.  
The environmental area is a good example. In it, “self-
regulation would not be effective, since “the impacts of 
one’s (wrongful) actions are not immediately felt by the 
person who is performing those actions” (Larsen 2019).  
 
(But Cybersecurity) is different, because if you mess up 
with your cybersecurity you put your own company at risk 
(…) So here, I think, regulation becomes more a question 
of setting the frame (…) Perhaps, if its very technical, 
defining some standards (would be enough). But then the 
exact level to which you want to protect your business 
could perhaps be left to the individual company (Larsen 
2019). 
 
The same informant, however, recognizes immediately 
that further distinctions concerning externalities might be 
relevant when claiming that “in certain sectors or for 
certain providers of essential services”, stricter regulation 
and enforcement might be relevant due to the “wider 
implications” of cyber threats, in terms of affecting society 
as a whole. Once again, we are reminded of the connection 
between cybersecurity and the safety of vessels, which is 
the topic discussed below.  
 
SAFETY, SECURITY, AND THE ISM CODE  
As mentioned before, all of the informants agree with the 
principle that regulation of maritime shipping is necessary. 
Moreover, they acknowledge that cybersecurity, in 
particular, should be regulated at the international level. At 
the IMO, maritime cyber risks are defined as “a measure 
of the extent to which a technology asset could be 
threatened by a potential circumstance or event, which 
may result in shipping-related operational, safety or 
security failures as a consequence of information or 
systems being corrupted, lost or compromised” (IMO 
2019).22  Their regulatory and governance effort in this 
field materializes into a set of guidelines and one 
resolution.  The latter , resolution MSC 429(98), Maritime 
Cyber Risk Management in Safety Management Systems, 
which was adopted by the Maritime Safety Committee in 
June 2017: (a) affirms that “safety management systems” 
should take into account cyber risks management in 
accordance with the objectives of the ISM code, (b) 
encourages administrations to ensure that cyber risks are 
appropriately addressed in safety management systems “no 
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later than the first annual verification of the company’s 
document of compliance after 1 January 2021”, (c) 
acknowledges that certain precautions are necessary to 
preserve confidentiality of cyber risk management, and, 
(d) requests member states to bring the resolution to the 
attention of stakeholders (IMO 2017a). 
This resolution had as background the Guidelines on 
Cyber Risk Management, approved earlier in the same 
year by the Facilitation Committee and the Maritime 
Safety Committee. These guidelines intended to “provide 
high-level recommendations on cyber risk management to 
safeguard shipping from current and emerging cyberthreats 
and vulnerabilities” (IMO, 2017b).  
It is important to understand some of the particularities 
concerning the above mentioned resolution, in particular 
regarding ambiguities concerning the management of 
cyber risks under the ISM or the ISPS codes. According to 
a document submitted by the United States, ICS and 
BIMCO to IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee in March 
2019, parts of resolution MSC 429(98) were not so clear, 
and needed to be addressed. More specifically, the co-
sponsors were concerned that the resolution could be 
interpreted as prioritizing provisions of the International 
Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code over those of 
the ISM code for cyber risk management. They also 
claimed that too much focus was being given to “counter 
external, malicious threats rather than providing a more 
holistic cyber risk management approach following the 
principles established in the ISM Code” (United States et. 
al. 2019, 2).  
Apparently, it makes sense to manage cybersecurity under 
the ISM (rather than ISPS) code due to its greater level of 
flexibility, which is more in tune with the rapidly changing 
landscape of cyber threats and technological development 
(Larsen 2019). More specifically, if cybersecurity goes 
under the ISPS, it means that it will be associated with the 
ship security plan, which is less flexible to changes, 
because each update to the plan has to be approved by 
authorities. This would also represent a larger cost for 
shipowners. Particularly in the case of shipowners with 
scarce resources, this could lead to postponements in 
updating important systems, thus making regulation 
suddenly “defeat its own purpose” (Larsen 2019)23.    
                                                          
23 The ISPS Code is focused on responding to external threats, malicious 
actions and 
physical security, and in this respect provides an incomplete framework 
for effective cyber risk 
management as outlined in paragraph 2.1.4 of MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3. 
Moreover, changes to the 
approved ship security plan require approval by the Administration. This 
reduces the 
Glamsø (2019) agrees, as it would represent “a huge cost 
and a bureaucratic hurdle” if cybersecurity were to be 
included in the ship security plan (under the ISPS code), 
rather than in the safety management plan (under the ISM 
code).The ship security plan is confidential, and cannot be 
verified by the port authority, while the safety 
management plan can. Inclusion into the ISM code would, 
in turn, allow for “greater responsiveness to emerging 
cyber risks identified by a company”, considering also that 
it would provide “a comprehensive framework for 
addressing cyber risks” (United States et al. 2019, 3).  
The view that cybersecurity should be included into the 
ISM code owes partly to an understanding of the nuances 
between safety and security24.  For Larsen (2019), the term 
security is more clearly associated with “the result of a 
deliberate act by someone who wants to hurt you and/or 
create a benefit for themselves at your expense”. That is 
why he and BIMCO prefer to talk about cyber risks 
management rather than cyber security. When it comes to 
cyber incidents that affect the operation of ships, 
maliciousness is not always the case (United States et al. 
2019, 1), and therefore, the association with the ISPS code 
might be not only inefficient, but also semantically wrong. 
Conversely, it is not always the case that cyberattacks have 
safety implications for ships. As an example, one could 
mention hackers accessing a ship’s administrative network 
to get access to commercially sensitive information about 
the cargo (Larsen 2019, Jensen 2018). This would 
characterize industrial espionage and would be considered 
an information security crime. Still, it would not imply a 
safety threat for the ship, and thus would not be covered 
under the ISM code (which does not address commercial 
issues). 
On the other hand, in the case of a vessel, a “security” 
issue might rapidly become an issue of safety for the 
vessel and its crew.  For instance, one could think of the 
hypothetical case of someone hacking into the ship’s 
engine control system from the outside and switching off 
the main engine, thus leading to a safety threat (Larsen 
2019). Similarly, a virus could stop the engine of a ship, 
and thus become a safety issue (Glamsø 2019), thus 
touching upon the problem of externalities.  
 
 
responsiveness of companies to newly identified cyber risks, and 
introduces a potentially 
significant and frequent administrative burden for Administrations 
24 As noted by Glamsø (2019) in the particular case of Denmark, there is 
potential for confusion between the terms safety and security, as the same 
word (sikkerhed) is usually used in reference to both. 
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Suppose your computer at the university gets infected…. 
Then the problem is (basically) for you. But if a hospital 
gets infected with a virus, it can have greater 
consequences for society, and regulation is thus necessary 
(Glamsø 2019). 
 
The analogy with cybersecurity in shipping makes sense, 
specially given that the consequences are not only 
commercial, but can also affect safety. Then the ISM code 
is there because “it assigns responsibility to shipping 
companies for cyber risk management”. If it weren’t for 
this, “you could always blame someone else, like the 
captain” (Glamsø 2019).  
BIMCO et al. (2018) also make this connection between 
safety and security, while at the same time proposing a 
distinction between “cyber security” and “cyber safety”. 
As mentioned in their guidelines, both cyber security and 
cyber safety should be heeded due to their safety 
implications: that is, due to “their potential effect on 
personnel, the ship, environment, company and cargo” 
(BIMCO et al. 2018, 3). Still, while cyber security “is 
concerned with the protection of IT, OT, information and 
data from unauthorized access, manipulation and 
disruption”, cyber safety covers “the risks from the loss of 
availability or integrity of safety critical data and OT” 
(BIMCO et al. 2018, 3). In other words, cybersecurity is 
related with maliciousness and with the causes of 
disruption, while cyber safety, which is the principal focus, 
deals with the consequences of such maliciousness for the 
integrity of the vessel, its equipment, crew and cargo25.   
 
INFORMATION SHARING, AWARENESS AND 
BRAND SENSITIVITY  
As discussed in several policy documents and scholarly 
publications, one of the most effective ways to respond to, 
and prevent, cyber incidents is information sharing. The 
findings have confirmed this, but also led us to understand 
some of the challenges associated with this practice – 
challenges which are either related with the nature of 
cybersecurity, particularities of the industry or both.  
In general, the expectation behind information sharing is to 
“help other members (of the industry) by means of 
awareness” and “learn through one another’s examples” 
(Christiansen 2018). Awareness is indeed a crucial aspect 
when it comes to preventing attacks, especially within an 
                                                          
25 Cyber safety incidents, according to BIMCO’s guidelines, could arise 
as the result of: “a cyber security incident, which affects the availability 
and integrity of OT, for example corruption of chart data held in an 
Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS), a failure 
occurring during software maintance and patching, loss of or 
manipulation of external sensor data, critical for the operation of a ship – 
industry that “still doesn’t see itself as a main target of 
cyber attacks”, but mostly as collateral damage 
(Christiansen 2018). 
The picture, however, might be changing for the better. A 
2017 survey conducted with CEOs from Danish shipping 
companies has shown an increase (as compared to the 
previous year) in the level of concern with cybercrime, 
something that was translated into practical actions, such 
as more robust IT security budgets (Danish Shipping 
2018). This was likely a reaction to the Mærsk attack, 
which occurred in the summer of the same year. Still, one 
should not ignore that “there are signs of a gradual change 
of mentality” (Christiansen 2018). Industry members thus 
seem to have internalized that there is a “high threat level 
posed by cyber criminals in the shipping industry”, even 
though it is “primarily directed at commercial operations 
and generally do not represent a direct threat to physical 
security interests and not particularly at physical security 
in the maritime sector” (Danish Defense Intelligence 
2017Centre for Cyber Security 2017).  Danish Shipping 
also backs this statement, when mentioning that the 
immediate risk is related to the security of data (Danish 
Shipping 2019). Still, there is the recognition that 
companies “operating in conflict areas”, may become 
“collateral damage in connection with destructive cyber 
attacks” (Danish Defense Intelligence Service 2017, 
13).Something that may also contribute to a higher level of 
awareness among Danish ship owners with regards to 
cybersecurity is the fact that the maritime sector has been 
considered as one of the priority areas in the field of 
information security. As previously mentioned, in the 
Danish Ministry of Finance’s Cyber and Information 
Security Strategy, published in 2018, six critical sectors 
were announced as deserving of specific and carefully 
tailored information security strategies, namely, energy, 
healthcare, transport, telecommunication, the financial 
sector and the maritime sector. The latter, according to the 
strategy, covers “security related to navigation in Danish 
Waters as well as security of ships registered under the 
Danish flag, together with their crew”. Moreover, “cyber 
security for ships includes services such as traffic 
monitoring, warnings and navigation information (AIS, 
NAVTEX), systems used by ships and software for 
operation of the ship, including propulsion and navigation” 
(Danish Ministry of Finance 2018, 37)26.   
this includes but is not lmited to Global Navigation Satellite Systems 
(GNSS)”. 
26 It is also important to mention that the raising of awareness has been 
central in the 2015-2016 cyber and information security strategy in 
Denmark. 
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The level of awareness regarding risks has also an 
important correlation with information sharing. When it 
comes to sharing information regarding attacks, two 
obstacles can be highlighted. The first refers to the fact 
that many attacks go undetected or take too long to be 
detected, while the second refers to the unwillingness to 
share information on them due to geopolitical concerns, 
fear of alerting the attacker and/or brand sensitivity. As to 
the first category (i.e. lack of knowledge about an attack), 
it is worth noting that it can take “on average 140 days 
between time of infection of a victim’s network and 
discovery of a cyberattack”, and that years could go by 
before an intrusion is detected (BIMCO et al. 2018, 11). 
Munro (2018), referring to the extreme example of the 
hacking of a ship, argues that this does not happen like 
usually shown in films. In other words, these attacks are 
“rarely visual” and thus “hard to detect”, thus challenging 
the usual claim that manual control over a vessel would 
easily counter it. 
Regarding the second challenge listed above (i.e. 
unwillingness to share information), even more obstacles 
are encountered, which are translated into the recognition 
by the IMO (2017b) of the fact that “precautions are 
necessary to preserve confidentiality of cyber risk 
management”. In 2014, Cyberkeel (now part of Improsec) 
published a whitepaper wherein it proposed, among other 
things, the creation of a forum or alliance within the 
shipping industry: a “trusted environment wherein 
companies can share specific technical details of ongoing 
cyber attacks to allow similar companies to easily scan, 
detect and deflect identical attacks” (Cyberkeel 2014, 25). 
The proposal never came into fruition due to particularities 
of the shipping industry that cannot be ignored. According 
to Jensen (2018), for an alliance of such nature to work 
there “has to be trust”, and this may be a challenge in a 
“truly global industry”. When one considers, for instance, 
that some carriers are “state owned” and that “threat 
actors” may be government themselves (see, for instance, 
von Seelen 2018 and BIMCO et al. 2018), the geopolitical 
obstacles to this kind of alliance becomes palpable. Here, 
it is important to recall that the NonPetya attack that 
paralyzed Maersk for 10 full days in 2017 was not aimed 
at the company itself but began rather as an assault of one 
nation (Russia) on another (Ukraine) (Greenberg 2018, 6).  
It is in this context that the intermediation of government 
authorities might be necessary. In Denmark, for instance, 
the recognition that “awareness of threats, identification of 
vulnerabilities and assessment of risks” are crucial parts of 
                                                          
27 The Centre for Cyber Security is a national ICT security authority, 
“responsible for preventive national advisory and information activities 
a Cyber and Information Security strategy has led to the 
establishment of a National Cyber Situation Center within 
the so-called Centre for Cyber Security27  (Danish Ministry 
of Finance 2018, 20-21). This center is responsible for 
receiving and processing information on cyber incidents 
that authorities and certain types of businesses are required 
to report. As an additional tool for facilitating the 
gathering of information, the government created a single 
digital solution for reporting security incidents (Danish 
Ministry of Finance 2018, 24). In connection with the 
broader national strategy and the specific sectoral strategy, 
a Danish Maritime Cybersecurity Unit has also been 
created “to provide advice and (…) serve as a 
communication hub with respect to cyber and information 
security for the entire maritime sector” (Danish Maritime 
Authority 2019, 5).  
The need to establish a safe channel to report breaches of 
security is also part of the implementation of the EU’s NIS 
Directive, of May 2018, which takes us into the field of 
regional regulation. From this directive, it follows that 
“operators of essential maritime services in the maritime 
sector must notify the Danish Maritime Authority (the 
Danish Maritime Security Unit) and the Centre for Cyber 
Security of incidents having had a significant impact on 
the continuity of the maritime services they provide” 
(Danish Maritime Authority 2019, 5). Besides this, and as 
a part of compliance with regulation, Danish ship owners 
and ships “using network and information systems” are 
required to “incorporate cyber security in their risk 
management measures” and have to “notify the Danish 
Maritime Authority and the CFCS of any incidents” that 
are covered under the Order laid down by the Danish 
Maritime Authority (Danish Maritime Authority 2019, 5). 
Finally, it is important to mention that the Danish 
Maritime Authority will work “as an exchange point 
between the maritime sector players and the CFSC” 
(Center for cybersecurity) (Danish Maritime Authority 
2019, 8). This intermediation could work in assuaging 
concerns regarding the exchange of sensitive information 
among companies who have other countries as 
shareholders.  
Moving beyond the field of geopolitical concerns, 
information sharing may also be hindered by the legitimate 
concern that it will alert the attacker, who might then get a 
competitive advantage in terms of modifying/improving 
his/her strategies and attacking again. Finally, also in the 
category of obstacles to information sharing one finds the 
issue of brand sensitivity and impact on one’s reputation. 
associated with cyber security in both the public and private sectors” 
(Danish Ministry of Finance 2018, 22). 
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That is, sharing information on an attack may send a signal 
“that you are not in control of your business” (Larsen 
2019).  Mærsk, however, has been “very open” about its 
Notpetya attack (Larsen, 2019), among other things 
because the incident was of large proportions, and thus 
difficult to conceal, but also because the NonPetya was 
conducted by a state actor by means which fall outside the 
capabilities of commercial companies to defend against. 
The lack of reporting has also proven a challenge in the 
case of maritime insurance. As Jensen (2018) mentions, in 
order to consider insurance for cyber incidents, insurance 
companies would ideally have access to the “statistics”. 
However, due to the fact that few organizations report 
incidents, these statistics do not exist. ENISA’s report 
confirms this concern, as it recommends that access to 
statistics on cyber security, derived from better 
information exchange would “help insurers to improve 
their actuarial models, reduce own risk” and thus offer 
“better contractual insurance conditions to the involved 
maritime stakeholders” (ENISA 2011, 21-22). A more 
active role by insurance companies in this field, the agency 
adds, would add economic incentives to heeding 
cybersecurity within the maritime sector.  
The International Union of Maritime Insurance (IUMI) has 
recently crafted a position paper on the matter. According 
to IUMI, although “stand-alone ransomware insurance 
products are now available”, insuring “consequential 
damages to hull, cargo and third-party liabilities from a 
cyber-attack on board a vessel or mobile offshore” is much 
more complicated and risky. This is the case, among other 
things, due to the “limited data (available) on the 
frequency, severity of loss or probability of physical 
damage” (IUMI 2019, 1) caused by cyberattacks.   
The so-called “cyberexclusion clause” is, however, subject 
to several shortcomings. If, for instance, a ship sinks due 
to a cyberattack chances are that underwriters will never 
know the real cause, “and yet they may cover the accident, 
which in practical terms means that they are already 
covering cybersecurity issues” (Jensen 2018). In other 
words, the lack of information on the causes of an accident 
make the cyber exclusion cause inefficient in some 
instances. 
BIMCO, however, as a first mover in the field, has 
recently drafted a standard Cyber Security Clause that 
“requires the parties to implement cyber security 
procedures and systems, to help reduce the risk of an 
incident and mitigate the consequences should a security 
breach occur” (BIMCO 2019). Getting coverage for 
cybersecurity incidents, however, also demands heeding 
the technological apparatus, and therefore the importance 
of moving into the next category, which concerns 
technology. 
 
SECURITY BY DESIGN, NUDGING, AND THE 
HUMAN FACTOR 
In a 2011 report ENISA (2011, 2, 11) wrote that due to 
high ICT complexity, it would be important to ensure 
“security by design” for all critical maritime ICT 
components. This claim is also reflected in the belief, 
specially on the part of senior management, that 
technology is the main solution for information security 
issues. Our informants, although aware of the importance 
of technological solutions, have painted a slightly different 
picture: one wherein more investment in cybersecurity 
suites does not automatically translates into more security. 
Jensen (2018) emphasizes this point by making use of two 
analogies:  
 
It is as if you were running a music festival and said that 
the safety of everyone depended only on the guards 
manning the gates (…) It doesn’t quite work like that!”.  
Similarly, he adds, “it is useless to have a sophisticated 
alarm system at home if you forget to lock the door” 
(Jensen 2018). 
 
Of course, procedures such as designing networks so that 
they can be physically segregated by the swift removal of a 
cable are important (von Seelen 2018). But these are 
simple, rather than technologically sophisticated 
procedures. Conversely, for most problems “there is no 
technical fix, but rather a human fix (Jensen 2018).   
As an example of the importance of human behavior in 
assuring cybersecurity, one can cite the example of 
mundane but potentially dangerous practices, such as the 
posting on social media of information regarding a vessel’s 
location, or of the fact that the manager is away at a  
business trip (Jensen 2018, Larsen 2019). Another 
example that is also related with human behavior, rather 
than with technology, is the use of weak passwords. 
Surprisingly, situations wherein the user name and the 
password are obvious, and connected to one another in 
obvious ways, are still pretty common (Munro 2018). 
Here, at least, the enforcement through technology of 
stronger passwords may assuage the problem.  
It is based on this assumption that techniques such as 
“nudging” have been considered fruitful. In the case 
hereby discussed, nudging could amount, for instance, to 
promoting positive behavior (i.e. an email from 
management thanking employees who heeded information 
security policies) and giving feedback, investing on visual 
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communication, and behavioral changes through training 
(Hulgaard 2018).  Moreover, management needs to 
understand that “increased levels of cyber security (will 
come) at the price of having to modify business processes 
in such a way that daily business operations might be 
impacted” (Cyberkeel 2011, 2).  
Another problem related with information security and 
technology lies in the lack of control over vendors. As 
Jensen mentions (2018), many systems are basically sold 
on what he calls “IKEA mode”, meaning that they cannot 
be altered.  
 
Your load master systems, your navigation systems, all 
these different ones you buy from a third party, where not 
all these third party providers are so savvy into 
cybersecurity either (…) You can of course go to the 
vendor and say that this is not good enough. But the 
vendor would likely say, sorry, that is what we sell (Jensen 
2018). 
 
The problem might become even more complex if we 
think ahead, in terms of remote controlling of ships and 
even autonomous ships. Here, questions of security by 
design, accountability and responsibility, “also in terms of 
vendor responsibility”, might become increasingly relevant 
(Glamsø 2019).  
Understanding the importance of vendors in the chain of 
accountability BIMCO et al (2018) have also included in 
their guidelines a recommendation for companies to 
“define their own minimum set of requirements to manage 
supply chain or 3rd party risks” (BIMCO et al, 2018, 8). 
Already on phase 1, called the pre-assessment phase, the 
guidelines suggest that companies should identify main 
producers of critical shipboard IT and OT equipment and 
identify cyber-security points-of contact and a working 
relationship with each of them. The Danish Cyber and 
Information Security Strategy, while applying to a broader 
field, also highlights, under the category of “joint efforts”, 
the importance of managing “suppliers of outsourced IT 
services” (Danish Ministry of Finance 2018, 17). At the 
Danish Maritime Authority’s strategy, which follows from 
it, the need to control suppliers and outsourcing is 
described as an effort “to strengthen supply chain 
management”. In other words, considering the increasing 
digitalization of vessels and complexity of systems, there 
is a significant degree of outsourcing, which increases in 
turn the importance of assuring “supplier’s security level” 
and “quality performance” (Danish Maritime Authority 
2019, 6).  
Another important aspect concerning the relationship with 
vendors and cybersecurity refers to the increasing 
proximity between Operational Technologies (OT) and 
Information Technologies (IT). As the BIMCO et al. 
guidelines mention, “IT and OT systems software and 
maintenance can be outsourced to third-party service 
providers and the company, itself, may not possess a way 
of verifying the level of security supplied by these 
providers” (BIMCO et al. 2018, 17).  To be sure, OT 
systems control the physical world (egg. hardware and 
software that control physical devices and processes) while 
IT systems deal with data. However, due to internet and 
technologies such as sensors and internet of things, both 
are getting much closer to one another (see Danish Ship 
Finance and Rainmaking 2018) and the difference is 
getting blurred. This blurring of boundaries, however, 
should also be reflected into different practices, such as a 
closer connection between IT departments and chief 
engineers responsible for purchasing OT systems (BIMCO 
et al. 2018).  
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We started this research effort with a couple of 
assumptions about the governance of cybersecurity in 
maritime shipping. More specifically, we assumed that 
although the shipping industry is known to be heavily 
regulated, self-regulation (or even no regulation at all) 
would be sufficient in the case of cybersecurity. In other 
words, given that it is on the self-interest of organizations 
to heed cyber hygiene, imagining a complex cybersecurity 
governance framework appeared to make little sense. At 
the early stages of the project, another assumption was that 
new technologies, particularly with the development of 
artificial intelligence, would play a crucial role in assuring 
cybersecurity with the least possible interference of 
humans. Throughout the process of collecting data for this 
research, however, we have come to dispute and/or refine 
some of these assumptions and arrive at new conceptions, 
which are listed below. 
First, the maritime shipping industry is very careful in its 
selection of words and framing when it comes to the 
security of information systems. More specifically, it is 
meticulous in defining the specificities of the cyber threats 
which affects it, thus heeding to important categories 
suggested in the literature on cybersecurity, information 
systems security and cybercrime. If we use Friedman’s 
(2011) three broad areas of cybersecurity, for instance, we 
may claim that most stakeholders within the shipping 
industry, as well as regulatory authorities, agree that 
industrial espionage and cybercrime are currently the main 
hazards to be confronted in the field of cyber and 
information security. Conversely, they assuage the 
magnitude of the risks within the field of national security 
– at least in times of peace. Within these two broad areas 
(espionage and cybercrime), the “machine”, or digital 
technologies, function as mere tools in what Wall (2017) 
calls “crimes that use the machine”. In other words, these 
are traditional crimes, that could have been conducted 
through different (non-digital) media, such as a phone, or 
even without the assistance of technologies. The only 
difference is that they have been given a “new”, digital 
face, and possibly more efficiency. The category of 
“crimes against the machine” (Wall 2017, 180), as seen in 
the case of Mærsk, are also a possibility. However, this is 
usually considered an instance of “collateral damage”, 
rather than a targeted attack.  
Another related point is the association between 
cybersecurity and the intention of causing harm. Using the 
categories proposed by Arduin (2018), we have seen from 
the analyzed data that most information security incidents 
in the shipping industry occur either due to unintentional 
or to intentional but non-malicious actions on the part of 
employees, thus leaving out the category of intentional and 
malicious. However, if we consider that the victim in this 
case is always the shipping organization, employees within 
the organization (i.e. the human element) may either be the 
intentional perpetrators or criminals, which is rarely the 
case, or a mere instrument of the crime, in the same way as 
the technology. In other words, “crimes that use the 
machine”, to use Wall’s (2018) category, perpetrated by 
diverse types of cybercriminals, are also crimes that “use” 
humans (intentionally or not) as mediators, which blurs the 
distinction between these categories. This conclusion 
reinforces Arduin’s (2018) comprehensive understanding 
of information systems as including humans, and 
corroborates what has been highlighted by several sources: 
namely, that humans are both the biggest obstacle as well 
as the main solution to cybersecurity. Moreover, probably 
due to this subtle understanding that most cyber incidents 
in the shipping industry are not intentional that the word 
cybersecurity in being used with parsimony and care, and 
other terms such as “maritime cyber risk management” and 
“cyber safety” are preferred.  
At this point, we may approach issues of regulation and 
self-regulation. As noted by the informants, the potential 
problem of a “race to the bottom” or an “unleveled playing 
field” applies not only to issues such as environmental 
protection, but potentially also to cyber risk management, 
thus making regulation necessary. The reason for this 
regulatory penchant, however, has to do specifically with 
the fact that cyber risks are mainly associated with safety 
issues in shipping, to the extent that information 
technologies (IT) are currently connected with operational 
technologies (OT). As the literature has shown, and the 
sources interviewed corroborated, history has proven that 
safety records are negatively affected in the absence of 
regulation. Therefore, if cyber hygiene is positively 
DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS  
  
27 
DI
SC
US
SI
ON
 A
ND
 L
IM
ITA
TIO
NS
   
 
correlated to safety, it should as well be regulated. 
Moreover, there are both positive and negative 
externalities in cybersecurity, which the market alone 
cannot resolve, and this demands that regulators step in.   
What most informants do not discern, however, is that the 
governance framework we currently see in the industry is 
closer to a co-regulatory than a pure regulatory model in 
cybersecurity, or what Walters and Bailey (2013) would 
call a “regulated self-regulatory” model. This is the case 
because more traditional regulatory tools, such as 
inspections by port authorities, are combined with the use 
of guidelines, such as the ones produced by BIMCO et al. 
(2018). Moreover, the very inclusion of cyber risks within 
the ISM code gives a lot of leeway and flexibility for 
organizations, thus departing from traditional command-
and-control options.  
As seen in the literature, even in instances where negative 
externalities are clear, such as in the case of pollution and 
the nuclear industry, some form of regulated self-
regulation is possible and effective. In other for this to 
work, however, employees and employers, and particularly 
managers, have to take up responsibility, and understand 
that their actions affect not only the organization’s 
finances, but also its image (see Aalders and Wilthagen 
1997, 421). 
The connection between cybersecurity and vessel safety 
also opens up the path for an incursion into the field of 
corporate social responsibility or enterprise liability. The 
principle that organizations are accountable to society at 
large, which is supported by stakeholder theory, is easily 
shown in countless instances wherein the environment and 
workplace safety are at stake. Therefore, from the moment 
one connects cybersecurity to safety (a connection that is 
done through the material connection between IT and OT), 
one opens up the possibility of framing cybersecurity as an 
issue of corporate social responsibility.  
To that extent, this report recommends that cyber hygiene 
be directly and more explicitly associated with the vessel’s 
safety, as well as with social responsibility and 
accountability. Similarly to the way in which some 
organizations keep track of, and promote, the amount of 
days in a row without workplace accidents, shipping 
organizations could explore a similar strategy, wherein 
workers feel that, by taking care of the safety of 
information systems, they are actually benefitting the 
whole of the organization and also society as whole. For 
this connection to be made, however, it should be 
understood that: 
 
 
- Not all cyber security incidents are intentional  
- Information systems affect the safety of vessels  
- Humans, rather than technologies alone, are the 
most important points of resistance  
The proposed strategy is to some extent not so different 
from nudging, although the idea here is to use 
accountability and responsibility as an incentive for correct 
behavior. We should also observe that it makes sense to 
focus on the issue of cyber risks as being one of safety, 
rather than systems integrity, which is usually seen as 
highly technical and might be associated with low levels of 
self-efficacy on the part of employees.  
Having said this, we do agree that regulation needs to 
remain in place, and that the governance model that the 
IMO has suggested for cyber risks (i.e. the ISM Code) is 
adequate, considering mainly that they take into account 
something that the data has shown, namely, that it is more 
a managerial and organizational, than a technical issue. We 
also believe that, at the national level, Denmark has 
promoted effective initiatives to govern cyber and 
information security in maritime shipping by 
acknowledging the particularities of this sector, the 
importance of establishing a dialogue with regulators at 
different tiers, and the importance of education and the 
human factor.   
Now before we reach the conclusion of this work, it is 
important to acknowledge some of its limitations. First and 
foremost, we should recognize the limited amount of 
informants we accessed. Ideally, we would have 
interviewed informants from the Danish Maritime 
Authority, from other Danish governmental authorities, 
and possibly from IMO and ENISA, in order to increase 
the robustness of the findings through the consultation of 
national, regional and international regulatory authorities. 
Interviews with other industry stakeholders and even with 
ship operators would also have benefitted this research. 
Another path that we did not pursue, and which also 
constitutes a limitation, is a more thorough exploration of 
the current technologies used in the maritime shipping 
industry and how they affect cyber resilience. Finally, it is 
also important to highlight that the research was mostly 
exploratory, and does not consist of a comprehensive study 
of the Danish case – thus the choice of using “Danish 
maritime shipping industry” in the title, rather than the 
terms “case study” or “Danish case”.  
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This report concludes a one-year project that investigates 
the nature and adequacy of the governance framework for 
cyber security in the maritime shipping, using the Danish 
shipping industry as a reference case. Besides different 
literatures, we have analyzed several reports and 
regulations, which were supplemented with data collected 
through interviews and participation in workshops.  
We argue that the development of technology is 
connecting IT and OT to such extent that cybersecurity is 
intrinsically connected with safety in maritime shipping, 
thus making regulation necessary. This does not, however, 
invalidate self-regulatory initiatives on the part of industry 
associations, which are fundamental in providing 
parameters for best practices and for proposing additional 
layers of accountability.  
Regarding technology, although one should acknowledge 
the importance of advancements, such as those in the field 
of artificial intelligence, we should understand techno-
regulation as the use of technology in guiding and 
promoting desirable behavior. To that extent, it is more 
closely associated with “nudging” that with security by 
design types of solution.  
We also affirm that the human element is the most 
important in promoting cyber hygiene, thus the importance 
of awareness campaigns, organizational culture and the 
commitment of top management. Here, we recommend 
that a clearer association between cyber hygiene, safety, 
and social responsibility and accountability might increase 
the levels of cybersecurity within organizations, by 
attracting a higher commitment on the part of employees.  
Reiterating part of the discussion, we recommend that 
cyber hygiene be directly and more explicitly associated 
with the vessel’s safety and, thereby, framed as an issue of 
social responsibility and accountability. In other words, 
similarly to other health and safety issues, and to 
environmental matters, it might make sense to frame cyber 
resilience as an area of social responsibility in the 
maritime shipping industry, and a priority cause for top 
management, and each employee. This, in a country like 
Denmark, which prides itself of its levels of digitalization, 
as well as of its maritime shipping industry, may be an 
interesting strategy for “cruising digitalization”.  
Finally, we suggest that these recommendations, as well as 
the regulatory framework that applies to this case be 
revised in the near future, in light of coming 
transformations promoted by automation, and specially the 
concept of unmanned ships. 
 
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
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